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Painting on a broader canvas? 
The need for a wider consideration of moral rights under EU law 
Paul Hughes* 
Introduction 
EU law has yet to establish a coherent approach to moral, or non-pecuniary, rights. 
Moreover, what little attention EU law has paid to moral rights has generally ignored their 
fundamental rights aspects. This is surprising, given the significance of the fundamental 
rights of dignity and privacy and the manner in which they blend into moral rights. Moral 
rights stem from Article 6bis of the Berne Convention1, form an important element within 
droit d’auteur systems of copyright2 and are based on authorial autonomy. Moral rights 
provide protection against the derogatory treatment of copyright works in order to 
safeguard an author’s honour and reputation. They enable authorial attribution with respect 
to those works and, in some jurisdictions3, a right to determine their disclosure and 
withdrawal. There is a strong linkage between the concept of authorial autonomy that 
underpins moral rights and the EU fundamental rights of dignity and, to some degree, 
privacy. Moreover, whilst dignity is a difficult concept, it is an expansive one that can 
embrace self-respect, the right to respect from others, autonomy, privacy, integrity and self-
determination4. Dignity operates as a constitutional value under EU law and has an 
interpretative role in relation to EU free movement, competition law and copyright 
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1
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, adopted in 1886 revised at 
Rome on 2
nd
 June 1928, revised at Brussels on 26
th
 June 1948, and revised at Stockholm on 14
th
 July 
1967; concluded at Paris on 24 July 1971. The1928 revisions provided protection for non-pecuniary or 
moral rights. The Berne Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). 
2
The French term droit d’auteur (German Urheberrecht) is generally used in relation to the copyright 
laws of civil law countries (and more recently the EU law approach to copyright) that focuses on the 
autonomy of authors and their intellectual creativity. It can be contrasted with the copyright laws of 
common law countries, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, where the interests of the copyright 
owner tend to receive more favourable treatment and where there is a greater focus on the 
economic interests associated with copyright. 
3
Under French law, for example, an author has a right of non-divulgation (Article L 121-2 of the Code 
de la Propriété Intellectuelle of 1 July 1992) and withdrawal (Article 121-4 of the Code), as to 
withdrawal, the author can prevent further reproduction, distribution or representation in return for 
compensation paid to the distributor of the work for the damage that may have been caused to him. 
4
See, for instance, Catherine Dupré ‘Commentary on the Articles of the EU Charter Article 1 – Human 
Dignity’ in ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary’ Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff 
Kenner and Angela Ward (editors) (Hart 2014) at p. 19 
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harmonising measures, all of which have the capacity to interact with moral rights. This 
article will argue that the EU should recognise the association between dignity and 
autonomy-related moral rights far more explicitly. This, in turn, could facilitate the 
harmonisation of moral rights in the EU, particularly with respect to those EU Member 
States, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, which have failed to introduce non-
pecuniary interests in an entirely adequate manner at national level. 
The EU Court of Justice (‘CJEU’)5 and the EU General Court (‘GCEU’)6 have almost entirely 
ignored moral rights when addressing copyright issues. Despite the close association 
between fundamental rights of dignity and privacy and moral rights, the CJEU has paid scant 
attention to these aspects7 , having instead concentrated on the issue of copyright 
originality8. Whilst the CJEU has emphasised the key role of an author’s intellectual creativity 
when determining copyright originality, it has failed to consider how this creativity is in turn 
dependent on the authorial autonomy that moral rights promote, an attribute which is 
potentially buttressed by the fundamental rights of dignity and privacy. The approach of the 
EU courts is a startling one. The fundamental right of freedom of expression has received 
judicial consideration9 and, if the EU courts are prepared to address that fundamental right, 
                                                          
5
The CJEU is the superior EU court established under Article 19 TEU, with responsibility for the 
uniform application and interpretation of EU law, acting in cooperation with EU Member State 
judiciaries, which may refer issues of interpretation of EU law to it under Article 267 TFEU. It hears 
appeals from the junior EU court, the General Court of the EU, relating to decisions taken by the EU 
Commission in the latter’s role as the primary enforcer of EU competition law. The mechanism 
enabling a court or tribunal of a Member State (and requiring a national court or tribunal of last 
resort) to refer matters of interpretation to the CJEU has enabled the CJEU to develop important legal 
doctrines, such as that of direct effect and supremacy, which have elevated certain forms of EU law 
above national law and have resulted in the conferral of certain rights and remedies on private 
parties, including a right of redress if harmed by a practice in breach of EU competition law. 
6
The GCEU, also established under Article 19 TEU, has the task of ensuring that the law is observed in 
the interpretation and application of EU law. The GCEU is the EU court of first instance having 
jurisdiction to hear appeals against competition law decisions adopted by the EU Commission. 
7
Cases 55 & 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v GEMA [1981] ECR 147 (at paragraph 12) when 
the CJEU acknowledged that “copyright comprises moral rights” of the kind indicated by the French 
Government in that case. However, the CJEU chose to concentrate on the fact that copyright “also 
comprises other rights, notably the right to exploit commercially”, when addressing a free movement 
issue. Advocate General Warner similarly chose to focus on the cross-border sale aspect of the case. 
8
For example, Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening [2009] ECR I-6569; 
Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH and Others [2011] ECR I-12533 Case 
C393/09 Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace v Ministerstvo Kultury [2010] ECR I-13971; Joined Cases C-
403 and 429/08 Football Association Premier League v QC Leisure and Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services [2011] ECR I-9083 
9
For example in Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises 
International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker where, in the context of the Information Society Directive 
(Directive 2001/29/EC), the CJEU held that whether the posting on a website of hyperlinks to 
protected works, which were freely available on another website (without the copyright holder’s 
consent), constituted a ‘communication to the public’ depended on whether those links were 
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they should also engage in a broader consideration of other fundamental rights, such as 
dignity and privacy, recognising their close association with moral rights and given that 
dignity is a foundational value of the EU. 
This article will depict the moral rights conferred by the Berne Convention and the 
treatment of the Convention by the CJEU, which has focused on the pecuniary rather than 
the moral rights associated with it. The article will consider how the moral rights created by 
the Berne Convention have been stripped of much of their meaning in certain common law 
Member States, an erosion of the dignitarian aspects of those rights that the CJEU has done 
little to rectify. It will assess the copyright law of the United Kingdom and Ireland, which 
have approached moral rights tentatively. The United Kingdom, in particular, has 
implemented moral rights in a narrow and tortuous way, with English courts focusing on an 
economic evaluation of, what should be, dignitarian issues. The article will analyse how a 
dignitarian-based approach to moral rights could help to address these shortcomings and 
facilitate the promotion of fundamental rights and the harmonisation of moral rights within 
the EU. 
The historic reluctance of the EU courts to address moral rights divergences (in order to 
achieve a balance between the various interests on which they impinge) may well be driven 
by a concern that the task is too complex and insufficiently susceptible to judicial 
intervention. The article accordingly concludes that the issue is probably one that should be 
addressed by overarching EU legal measures and that a greater focus on relevant 
fundamental rights might act as a unifying force and could act as a platform for greater 
legislative harmonisation in this field. Since much of EU jurisprudence and EU legislative 
endeavours to date have focused on the economic aspects of copyright, bringing 
fundamental rights more to the fore in the context of copyright and moral rights offers an 
opportunity for harmonisation within the EU by reference to principles that recognise 
copyright’s pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects. Dignity and privacy rights undergird the 
General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)10 and the GDPR offers an example of how 
                                                                                                                                                                      
provided free of charge by a person who did not know or could not reasonably have known the illegal 
nature of the publication of those works. The CJEU sought to balance “31. … on one hand, the 
interests of copyright holders and related rights in protecting their intellectual property rights, 
safeguarded by Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the 
Charter’) and, on the other, the protection of the interests and fundamental rights of users of 
protected objects, in particular their freedom of expression and of information, safeguarded by 
Article 11 of the Charter … “. 
10
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
th
 April 2016 [2016] 
OJ L 119/1 4.5.2016 
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fundamental rights can act as a stable platform for harmonisation, one that has balanced 
data protection and privacy concerns whilst also seeking to address the need for data 
utilisation and free movement. Recognising that the harmonisation of copyright within the 
EU is likely to require the adoption of a Regulation, the GDPR thus points the way to how 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights could be calibrated in this context. 
Academic focus to date 
Whilst much has been written about the economic and legal issues relating to the 
interaction between EU Member State copyright laws, EU copyright law harmonisation 
programmes and EU jurisprudence generated in the context of EU free movement11 and 
competition law12, there has been little academic consideration of copyright’s underlying 
non-pecuniary, or moral rights in an EU law context. Thus there has been little or no 
evaluation of moral rights by reference to the fundamental right of dignity or privacy, nor as 
to whether such a focus both prompts the need for a greater emphasis on moral rights 
within the EU legal order and indicates a legal basis for the harmonisation of pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary rights. 
Commentators have focused on moral rights by reference to two aspects. First, they have 
tended to analyse the differing methods of implementing moral rights at the national level 
under the Berne Convention and the absence of any harmonised approach. Second, when 
                                                          
11
David T. Keeling ‘Intellectual Property Rights in EU Law: Volume I Free movement and Competition 
Law (Oxford University Press 2003); Giuseppe Mazziotti ‘EU Digital Copyright Law and the End-User’ 
(Springer 2008); Benedetta Ubertazzi ‘The Principle Of Free Movement Of Goods: Community 
Exhaustion and Parallel Imports’ in ‘EU Copyright Law: A Commentary’ (Elgar Commentaries Series) 
Irini A. Stamatoudi and Paul Torremans (editors) (Edward Elgar 2014) at pages 38 to 51; Justine Pila 
and Paul Torremans ‘European Intellectual Property Law’ (Oxford University Press 2016) at pages 51 
to 56 
12
For example, P. Aghion, N. Bloom, R. Blundell, R. Griffith and P. Howitt ‘Competition and Innovation: 
An Inverted-U Relationship’ (2005) 120 Quart J of Econ 71; L. Peeperkorn ‘IP Licences and 
Competition Rules: Striking the Right Balance’ (2003) 26 World Competition 527; S.D. Anderman and 
J. Kallaugher ‘Technology Transfer and the New EU Competition Rules: IP Licensing after 
Modernisation (Oxford University Press 2006); Josef Drexl (editor) Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law Edward Elgar 2008; Jochen Lorentzen and Peter Møllgaard 
‘Competition Policy and Innovation’ in Bianchi, Patrizio and Labory, Sandrine (editors) International 
Handbook on Industrial Policy (Edward Elgar 2006); Ian Forrester ‘Regulating Intellectual Property Via 
Competition? Or Regulating Competition via Intellectual Property?’ Competition and Intellectual 
Property: ten years on, the debate still flourishes’ in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (editors), European 
Competition Law Annual 2005: the Interaction Between Competition Law and Intellectual Property 
Law (Oxford: Hart, 2007); Steven Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (editors) ‘Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law: New Frontiers’ (Oxford University Press 2011); Steve Anderman and Hedvig 
Schmidt ‘EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: The Regulation of Innovation’ 
(Cambridge University Press 2nd edition 2011); Jonathan D.C. Turner ‘Intellectual Property and EU 
Competition Law’ (Oxford University Press Second Edition (2015). 
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addressing the potential tension between fundamental rights and copyright (including, to a 
very limited degree, moral rights), commentators have frequently done so by reference to 
the right to freedom of expression. For instance, Treiger-Bar-Am has explored the moral 
right of integrity as a form of freedom of expression but has not evaluated this right by 
reference to dignity13. The treatment of human rights and intellectual property to be found 
within the Edward Elgar Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property14 
only addresses the issue of dignity by reference to the development of patented 
medicines15. Geiger has also briefly highlighted16 the exclusion from patentability of those 
processes that offend against human dignity under the EU Directive on the legal protection 
of biotechnical inventions17. More typical are authors such as Halpern and Johnson18, who 
have focused on the role of Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (the 
‘Charter’)19 in protecting intellectual property rights and the protection of freedom of 
expression under Article 11. Peers et al, in their extensive analysis of the Charter20, do not 
address the issue of moral rights and dignity. Hence, the concept of moral rights as 
comprising a fundamental right that is linked to dignity remains relatively unexplored. This is 
a gap in the literature that this article will seek to address through a fuller consideration of 
the concept of dignity and authorial autonomy. 
Dignity and Kant’s moral philosophy 
                                                          
13
Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am ‘The Moral Right of Integrity: a Form of Freedom of Expression’ in ‘New 
Directions in Copyright: Volume 2’ Fiona Macmillan (editor) (Edward Elgar 2007) 
14
‘Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property’ Christophe Geiger (editor) (Edward 
Elgar 2015) 
15
Aurora Plomer ‘Human Dignity and Patents’ in Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual 
Property’ ibid at pp. 479 to 495 
16
Christophe Geiger ‘ The Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property’ in ‘Intellectual Property 
and Human Rights’ Paul C. Torremans (editor) (Kluwer Law International 2008) at page 116, footnote 
73 
17
Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal 
protection of biotechnological inventions [1998] OJ L 213/13 30.7.1998 Recital (38): “Whereas the 
operative part of this Directive should also include an illustrative list of inventions excluded from 
patentability so as to provide national courts and patent offices with a general guide to interpreting 
the reference to ordre public and morality; whereas this list obviously cannot presume to be 
exhaustive; whereas processes, the use of which offend against human dignity, such as processes to 
produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals, are obviously also 
excluded from patentability;” 
18
Sheldon Halpern and Phillip Johnson ‘Harmonising Copyright Law and Dealing with Dissonance: A 
Framework for convergence of US and EU Law’ Edward Elgar 2014 at page 135. 
19
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) p. 391 26.10.2012 
20
‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary’ Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner 
and Angela Ward (editors) (Hart 2014) 
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The concept of dignity encompasses the qualities ascribed to it by Kant, namely autonomy, 
the right for individuals not to be treated as  “… a mere means of use for others … “21, with 
dignity representing “… a basic standard for personal relations… “22. 
 
Human dignity is central to Kant’s moral philosophy, which has at its heart the principle that 
a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, and which is grounded in the view 
that each human is possessed of equal worth and is worthy of equal respect. In his ‘The 
Metaphysics of Morals’ Kant stated that: 
“Humanity is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any 
human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the 
same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists … But just 
as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would conflict with his duty of self-
esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the necessary self-esteem of others, as 
human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge in a practical way, the 
dignity of humanity in every other human being … “23. 
Kant’s philosophy makes clear the relationship between dignity and autonomy and has been 
viewed as offering the most apposite theoretical justification for intellectual property law24. 
Its emphasis on autonomy envisages the freedom in which an author’s thoughts and ideas 
can be transformed into fully realised form and it anticipates a space in which authors’ 
imaginings can find their ultimate expression. Merges believes that Kant’s philosophical 
insights aptly express and reflect the frequently intangible nature of both the creative act 
and the fruits of that creativity.  Kant’s philosophy provides a clear linkage between the 
autonomy and dignitarian rights and its perception of dignity is consistent with the concept 
as understood within the EU legal order. 
Dignity as an EU constitutional value 
Certain constitutions recognise human dignity as a constitutional value but not as a right 
and, where both of these are acknowledged constitutionally, the value may be regarded as 
                                                          
21
Thomas E. Hill, Jr. ‘Kantian perspectives on the rational basis of human dignity’ in ‘The Cambridge 
Handbook on Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives’ Marcus Düwell, Jens Braarvig, Roger 
Brownsword and Dietmar Mieth (editors) (Cambridge University Press 2014) at page 219 
22
Ibid at page 221. 
23
Immanuel Kant ‘The Metaphysics of Morals’ (Cambridge University Press 2009) at page 209 
24
Robert P Merges ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’ (Harvard University Press 2011). 
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having a broader scope than the right, as is the case in the German constitution25. The exact 
meaning of the value or the right of dignity is to be ascertained from the express or implied 
meaning of the relevant constitution, as interpreted judicially26, with constitutional structure 
playing “a role in interpreting both … “27. 
Within the EU legal order, Article 2 of the EU Treaty (‘TEU’)
 
28 states that one of the 
foundational values of the EU is “respect for human dignity”. Article 1 of the Charter 
declares that human dignity is “inviolable” and a right that “must be respected and 
protected.” The preamble to the Charter refers to the EU being founded on “indivisible, 
universal values” that include human dignity and emphasises that the individual is to be 
placed “at the heart” of the EU’s activities. Dupré is of the view that Article 1 of the Charter 
renders human dignity “ … the first right and principle … “ of the Charter and that Article 2 
TEU constitutes it as “ … the very first foundational value of the EU … “, which she regards as 
a form of codification “ … at the EU’s highest normative level … “ of strong dignity 
commitments that exist in almost all Member States.29 She considers the normative strength 
of dignity to be substantial. However, this strength is not matched by precise semantic or 
theoretical qualities30, with the exact meaning of dignity as a value requiring greater judicial 
elaboration. 
Further clarity as to the meaning of the right to dignity is provided by the 2010 Annual 
Report on the Charter’s application31 (and by the Reports for 2011, 2012 and 2013, which 
express the right in similar terms to those used in 2010). This definition echoes Kant’s 
philosophy: 
“Human dignity is the basis of all fundamental rights. It guarantees the protection of 
a human person from being treated as a mere object by the State or by his fellow 
                                                          
25
Aharon Barak ‘Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right’ (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) who categorises dignity as being a social value, a constitutional value and a 
constitutional right, with the constitutional right being based on, but not being identical to, the 
constitutional value of human dignity (see pages 11 to 14). 
26
Ibid pages 73 to 74 
27
Ibid page 80 
28
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) p. 13 26.10.2012, 
29
Catherine Dupré ‘The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe” (Hart 
Publishing 2015) at page 3 
30
Catherine Dupré op cit. note 4 at pages 3 and 25. 
31
2010 Annual Report from the Commission on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
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citizens … None of the rights laid down in the Charter may be used to harm the 
dignity of another person.”32 
This elevation of dignity as a powerful right makes clear that dignity is to take precedence 
over other rights such as freedom of expression, which may not be used to undermine it. It 
also shows a clear association with autonomous behaviour, the latter being described by 
Christman as: “ … a cornerstone of basic rights and freedoms fundamental to the dignity that 
we owe to each other…”33. He distinguishes “control rights from income rights”34. His 
language suggests that those elements of a work that are more closely associated with 
autonomy and self-expression merit greater protection, based on fundamental rights, than 
those economic elements associated with a work (for which ownership is the most 
appropriate claim). This tallies with Woods’ observation, namely that the CJEU has 
seemingly ascribed a lower value to communications such as advertising as compared with 
other, less commercial, forms of expression35 in the context of the right of freedom of 
expression. 
The CJEU has not yet developed a significant body of jurisprudence regarding the meaning of 
‘dignity’, particularly as a foundational value under Article 2 TEU. However, there is a clear 
relationship between privacy, autonomy and the space within which authorial creativity can 
be expressed. Privacy also has close links with dignity rights. 
Privacy 
Article 7 of the Charter provides that: 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications.” 
                                                          
32
2010 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights EU Commission Justice 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/application/index_en.htm 
(accessed 21 May 2017). 
33
John Christman ‘Autonomy, social selves and IP claims’ in ‘New Frontiers in the Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property’ Annabelle Lever (editor) (Cambridge University Press 2012). 
34
Ibid at page 45. 
35
Lorna Woods ‘Article 11 – Freedom of Expression and Information’ in ‘The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary’ Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward 
(editors) (Hart 2014) in ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary’ Steve Peers, Tamara 
Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward (editors) (Hart 2014) at page 337 
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This is rather more narrowly configured than the right to privacy established by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights36 (‘the Declaration’), Article 12 of which states more 
expansively that: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the 
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
The more extensive wording of Article 12 of the Declaration indicates that there is room for 
a dignity-related and reputation-based right in the context of privacy, thus providing a 
connection with the dignity value under Article 1 of the Charter. 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’)37 requires that a person’s 
right to a person’s “private and family life, his home and his correspondence” be respected. 
The language of Article 8(1) ECHR confers a right to privacy in almost identical language to 
that of Article 7 of the Charter. Under Article 52(3) of the Charter, rights corresponding to 
those guaranteed by the ECHR must be interpreted in similar fashion, without prejudice to 
the possibility of more extensive EU protection. Whilst Article 8 ECHR does not explicitly 
confer a right to honour or reputation, the right to protection of reputation has been 
established as a Convention right under Article 8 ECHR. In the case of Pfeifer v. Austria38, the 
European Court of Human Rights held that:  
“33. As to the applicability of Article 8, the Court reiterates that “private life” 
extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a person’s name or picture, 
and furthermore includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity; the 
guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to ensure 
the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each individual 
in his relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of interaction of 
a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life”.39  
                                                          
36
Declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948 at the Palais de 
Chaillot, Paris. 
3737
Signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 
3838
Application no. 12556/03 [2007] ECHR 935 
3939
Citing Von Hannover v. Germany, application no. 59320/00, [2005] ECHR 555 
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It concluded that, in this case, Austria had not done enough to protect the individual’s 
reputation, which was “ … an element of his “private life”…”40. Accordingly a person’s right 
to protection of his or her reputation comprises part of the individual’s right to respect for 
private life and is encompassed within Article 8 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights 
has also ascribed dignity-related attributes to the right to private life in the Botta case41. 
In A and others v East Sussex County Council42, the English High Court noted that in Botta43, 
the European Court of Human Rights had “ … identified a person’s “physical and 
psychological integrity … “ as being part of the private life protected by Article 8 …”. The 
Court relied on the Declaration, the Charter and the ECHR in in holding that the concept of 
dignity was inherent in Article 8 of the ECHR and “ … indeed in almost every one … “44 of the 
ECHR’s provisions. Munby J held that: 
“The invocation of the dignity … is not some meaningless incantation … it is a solemn 
affirmation of the law’s and of society’s recognition of our humanity and of human 
dignity as something fundamental.” 
Munby J categorised the right to dignity as a “… call to us to “act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood …”.45 This obligation echoes sentiments expressed in rather more 
Kantian terms by the European Court of Human Rights in Botta, when it stated that: 
“32. … the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the Convention is primarily intended to 
ensure the development, without outside interference, of the personality of each 
individual in his relations with other human beings.” 
These judgments establish a clear association between privacy, dignity and the space within 
which authorial creativity can be expressed. In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis46 
depicted privacy as a basic fundamental right necessary for the development of a person as 
an autonomous individual. Benn has equated respect for a person as implying respect for 
that person as someone engaged in “a kind of self-creative enterprise” which could be 
disrupted by intrusion. Privacy rights demonstrate respect for the person “as an 
                                                          
4040
Ibid at paragraph 38. 
4141
Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 
42
[2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) 
43
Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 
44
Op cit note 46 per Munby J at paragraph 86. 
45
Ibid 
46
Samuel D. Warren, and Louis D. Brandeis ‘The Right to Privacy’ Harvard Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5 
(Dec. 15, 1890), pp. 193--220 
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autonomous individual” or “chooser”47. There is a link in this respect between privacy, 
autonomy and moral rights. The latter includes (within French law48) a right of non-
divulgation and withdrawal for authorial works. Violation of privacy is regarded as a failure 
to respect personhood and as treating a person as a means rather then an end, something 
to which the GDPR is strongly antagonistic. A lack of respect for privacy may be regarded as 
a mark or sign that that individual’s enterprise is not one worthy of respect or consideration 
and, according to Kupfer: 
“ … the individual feels the intrusion as a lack of respect … his projects and feelings, 
including feelings of  self-worth, aren’t important or valuable enough to check the 
other’s intruding impulses. When we violate someone’s privacy we don’t respect 
him … we don’t acknowledge the importance to the individual of his activity or the 
value of the individual himself.”49 
This language strongly links privacy with personal expression and dignity, sentiments that 
echo the respect for authorial works, including the moral rights associated with personal 
creativity. These views also suggest a utilitarian benefit, namely sufficient privacy and 
respect acting as a shield that will safeguard and engender productive enterprise. 
The Charter and constitutional interpretation 
Article 51 of the Charter states that its provisions are addressed to the EU institutions “and 
to the Member States … when they are implementing Union law … “, which must respect the 
Charter’s principles and promote its application. Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons consider that, 
since (by virtue of Article 2 TEU), “ … the EU is founded on the value of respect for human 
rights, one could argue that fundamental rights operate as a ‘meta-principle’ of 
constitutional interpretation, ie (sic) primary EU law must be interpreted in light of 
fundamental rights.”
 
50 
Article 3(6) TEU provides that the EU is to “ … pursue its objectives by appropriate means 
commensurate … “ with its Treaty competences. Although the EU’s values and objectives do 
                                                          
47
Stanley I. Benn, ‘Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons’, in ‘Privacy: Nomos XIII, ed.’ J. Pennock 
and J. Chapman (Atherton Press, 1971), pp. 1--26. 
48
Op cit note 3, Article 121-4 of the Code 
49
Joseph H Kupfer ‘Autonomy and Social Interaction’ (State University of New York Press 1990) at 
page 141 
50
Koen Lenaerts and José Antonio Gutiérrez-Fons ‘The Charter in the Constitutional Edifice’ in ‘The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary’ Steve Peers, Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner and Angela 
Ward (editors) (Hart 2014) at p. 1571 
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not independently create legally enforceable powers51, dignity is a key value that should be 
fully reflected in the CJEU’s role in interpreting EU harmonising measures and also in 
applying the free movement and competition law rules.  Wyatt and Dashwood note that: 
“… the values and objectives set out in Articles 2 and 3 obviously perform an 
important and sometimes even a definitive role when it comes to interpreting the 
nature and the limits of the powers vested in the Union institutions.”52 
Thus, the concept of dignity should be invoked when interpreting EU law applicable to moral 
rights, given the clear association between the two. 
Moral rights 
There are two moral rights cited in the Berne Convention. Article 6bis provides that 
“Independently of the author’s economic rights” and even after their transfer, the author 
has “the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or 
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would 
be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.” These two rights are to endure after the author’s 
death “at least until the expiry of the economic rights”, with the “means of redress” being 
governed by the law of the country “where protection is claimed.” 
In addition to these authorial moral rights, Article 5 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (‘WPPT’) obliges the contracting parties to grant the moral rights of 
integrity and attribution to performers, thereby aligning the rights of authors and 
performers in this respect53. Article 5 WPPT provides that: 
“(1) Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of 
those rights, the performer shall, as regards his live aural performances or 
performances fixed in phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the 
performer of his performances, except where omission is dictated by the manner of 
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the use of the performance, and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of his performances that would be prejudicial to his reputation. 
“(2) The rights granted to a performer in accordance with paragraph (1) shall, after 
his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights … “. 
The Article reflects divergences in approach, not only between common and civil law 
traditions, but also within the latter. Although signatory states have a wide degree of 
latitude in the implementation of Article 6bis, nevertheless this discretion is not unbounded 
since, under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention54, a treaty must be: 
“ … interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
There is scope to align national moral rights laws more closely around the civil law tradition. 
Adeney believes that the Vienna Convention requires the Article’s ambiguous language to be 
interpreted by reference to the French travaux preparatoires, with terms such as “honour” 
being interpreted by reference to French notions of moral rights55. This would place a far 
greater emphasis on authorial autonomy and dignity and lessen economic considerations 
when the courts of signatory states interpret the scope of the moral rights conferred by 
Berne. It would also bring the treatment of moral rights into line with the EU jurisprudence 
relating to the level of originality meriting copyright protection, namely the need to 
demonstrate authorial intellectual creativity56. The focus on the autonomy of authors and 
their intellectual creativity is an approach that can be termed ‘author-centric’. It would 
appear to be inconsistent to focus on this as the relevant standard for the exercise of 
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copyright’s pecuniary rights and yet not regard it as the appropriate basis for the exercise of 
moral rights. 
The CJEU’s treatment of the Berne Convention 
Whilst the EU is not a party to the Berne Convention, the CJEU has had regard to it in its 
judgments, largely by reference to economic rights. In Commission v Ireland57, the CJEU 
concluded that compliance with the Convention was subject to its review58 in relation to 
Ireland’s obligation to comply with the Berne Convention under the EEA Agreement59, to 
which it was then subject. In that case, Advocate General Mischo also accepted the EU 
Commission’s argument that many EU Directives were intended to implement the Berne 
Convention’s provisions60, including Directive 93/9861, which harmonised the term of 
protection of copyright covered by Articles 7 and 7A of the Berne Convention. The CJEU has 
also relied on concepts inherent within the Berne Convention, using employed language 
used in the Convention to address the issue of originality (“author’s own intellectual 
creation”) as an autonomous EU concept in Infopaq62. The CJEU focused on the author-
centric nature and creative qualities of the works to which national copyright should 
attach63, even when the relevant directive did not seek to address this specifically64. This has 
in turn has resulted in the English courts, for instance, moving towards a more author-
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centric test when establishing the originality of a work that would enable it to gain copyright 
protection65. 
These judicial developments are an indicator that, although the EU is not a party to the 
Berne Convention, the CJEU could nevertheless use the Berne Convention concepts of 
honour and reputation in order to harmonise moral rights more fully within the EU. Thus, it 
could employ fundamental rights (such as that of dignity and potentially privacy), in 
conjunction with reputational concepts inherent in the Berne Convention to shape EU moral 
rights in the future and thereby achieve greater levels of harmonisation, notwithstanding 
the current divergent approaches adopted at national level within the EU, particularly with 
respect to EU Member States that have common law traditions. 
Moral rights and divergent national treatment 
Both the United Kingdom, currently an EU Member State, and Ireland as common law 
countries have tended to focused on the economic aspects of copyright and to ignore the 
dignitarian or reputational aspects of moral rights. This is an approach that is evident in the 
United Kingdom’s copyright legislation and in related English jurisprudence. True adherence 
to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires a much greater focus on non-pecuniary or 
moral rights than either the legislature or English judiciary has displayed so far. The relevant 
provisions of the United Kingdom’s Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (‘CDPA’) are an 
inadequate attempt to implement Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, being hedged about 
with formalities, such as the need to assert the right of paternity or attribution66 and the 
inclusion of a right to waive either of these rights67 . Employees’ moral rights are 
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automatically ascribed to their employer68. In implementing Article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention, the relevant provisions of the CDPA largely undermine moral rights and Norman 
considers that, in implementing Article 6bis: “Parliament has twisted a straightforward 
personal right into a complex commercial transaction.”69 The UK has had appreciable 
difficulty in establishing clear statutory and jurisprudential principles that meaningfully 
address the non-pecuniary rights of authors.  English law continues to view an author’s 
integrity as reputation-based, to be assessed from the point of view of the public at large 
and rooted in the tradition of economic torts, such as defamation or passing off. The English 
courts have regarded an author’s views as too subjective a yardstick70, and have shown little 
consideration for authorial sensitivities. In Pasterfield v Denham71, Overend J considered the 
statutory reference to ‘honour and reputation’72, a key a factor in determining whether 
authorial work has been subject to derogatory treatment, and concluded that it was “not 
sufficient that the author is himself aggrieved by what has occurred”. 
The United Kingdom has implemented73 Article 5 WPPT and conferred moral rights of 
integrity and attribution on performers comparable to those granted to authors. It has also 
implemented the Related Rights Directive74 in order provide performers with fully assignable 
property rights and certain rights to remuneration75. As with the moral rights granted to 
authors in relation to their copyright works, the performer’s moral right of attribution must 
be asserted76 and both the right attribution and to object to derogatory treatment may be 
waived77. The complexities associated with the rights as introduced by the United Kingdom 
have been criticised by Liu78. 
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Dworkin has remarked that moral rights “intruded” into the common law’s economics-based 
copyright system79. Ireland, in keeping with the United Kingdom’s approach, has also 
enacted legislation that only partially implements its obligations in relation to Article 6bis. 
For instance, the Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 has qualified the paternity right. 
Whilst the Act does not contain the same convoluted requirements relating to the assertion 
of the right of attribution as those set out in the CDPA, the Act strips employees of their 
paternity rights80. In addition, the author has the right of protection against derogatory 
actions in relation to his or her work “which would prejudice his or her reputation”81, with 
the Irish statute crucially omitting the necessary dignity-related reference to “honour”. The 
Act introduces the moral right of paternity and the right to object to derogatory treatment 
in relation to performers82, although as with the moral rights of authors, all these rights can 
be waived83. 
By way of contrast, French and German law each treat moral rights as “at least the equal of 
economic rights.”84 Under the French Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle of 1 July 1992 the 
non-pecuniary or moral rights conferred by the French legislation embrace rights of 
attribution, integrity, disclosure and withdrawal. Article L121-1 of the French Code provides 
that: “An author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship and his work … 
“ a right that attaches to his person and that “ … is perpetual, inalienable and 
imprescriptible.” This right to respect for the author’s work is an extensive one, arising 
irrespective of the work’s quality and prohibiting even seemingly unimportant alterations or 
modifications85. However, the French court must conduct a balancing exercise with respect 
to the right to respect for the work and subsequently acquired property rights86. Whilst not 
so obviously grounded in a constitutional right as is the case in German law, moral rights 
enjoy much greater protection than that available in common law countries, such as the 
United Kingdom and Ireland. 
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Under German law the authorial right or personality is comprehended within Article 1 and 2 
of the German Basic Law87,  “the German constitutional safeguard of human dignity”88. The 
creation of a work thus generates “both moral rights and economic rights.”89 German law is 
based on Hegelian principles and regards “the work as the fulfilled expression of the 
author’s personality”90 and provides moral rights with the same duration as their economic 
rights. Under section 14 of the Author’s Rights Act91, the integrity of an author’s work must 
be maintained. The author has the right to prohibit distortions or impairments of his or her 
work that are apt to imperil his legitimate intellectual or personal interests in the work. The 
term ‘legitimacy’ involves a balancing of interests between author and the defending party, 
with “[t]he importance of the personality rights as giving expression to articles 1 and 2 of the 
Basic Law … always [being] either expressly or tacitly present in the consideration.92“ 
There is therefore a marked difference between the way in which certain Member States 
with a common law tradition (the United Kingdom and Ireland) have implemented moral 
rights, as compared with civil law countries, such as France and Germany. The nature of 
moral rights is rendered clearer by identifying their close association with fundamental 
rights, such as that of dignity, and such a focus also highlights the manner in which the laws 
of these common law Member States are at odds with these principles. This association 
between moral rights and fundamental rights also illuminates the way in which closer EU 
harmonisation of moral rights might proceed.  
Copyright, moral rights and fundamental rights 
Geiger has suggested constructing intellectual property rights from fundamental rights and 
human rights, which he believes “offer a synthesis of the bases of natural law and 
utilitarianism” and represent an “ideal basis from which to start”93. He has emphasised the 
fact that, whilst intellectual property is not explicitly mentioned in the Declaration, Article 
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27(2) states that everyone has the right to the protection of moral and material interests 
arising from those scientific, literary or artistic productions of which he is the author94. He 
regards fundamental rights as the appropriate framework for developing “a balanced 
framework” for intellectual property law (not least because they have been included in 
some national constitutions), with the property and personality rights inherent in 
intellectual property rights, for example copyright, needing to be aligned with fundamental 
rights such as freedom of expression, the right to privacy and human dignity.95 
To the extent that moral rights can either be categorised as or be seen as associated with 
fundamental rights (for instance as a means for securing fundamental rights), the case for 
greater judicial attention becomes more pressing. Rosati has publicly questioned whether 
moral rights are, in fact, fundamental rights96. On the other hand, Kennedy considers that 
the references in Article 27(2) of the Declaration and the similarly worded Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the protection of an 
author’s moral and material interests in his or her scientific, literary or artistic works are a 
basis for concluding that, even if “ … these provisions may not mean that IPRs are human 
rights: the former can be seen as legal mechanisms in order to give effect to the latter … “. 
Thus, if moral rights lack the necessary qualities of universality, inalienability and 
indivisibility to constitute a fundamental right themselves, they should nonetheless be 
interpreted in order to give effect to fundamental rights, such as that of dignity97. 
Dignity is not just an authorial issue. It is also a feature of privacy and data protection law. A 
fundamental rights-based approach is an inherent part of the architecture of EU data 
protection legislation and it could also play a greater role in the context of copyright and 
moral rights. The GDPR has achieved a balanced approach to the protection of personal 
data, a fundamental right under Article 8(1) of the Charter’98 and the EU’s economic goals. 
Beyond its data protection remit, the GDPR has as its further aims the strengthening and 
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facilitation of the convergence of the economies within the internal market and the 
attainment of “the well-being of natural persons”99. Recognising that the harmonisation of 
copyright within the EU is likely to require the adoption of a Regulation, the GDPR thus 
points the way to how both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights could be calibrated in this 
context. 
The GDPR strikes a Kantian note by stating that: “The processing of personal data should be 
designed to serve mankind.”100 The GDPR acknowledges that the right to the protection of 
personal data is not an absolute right and requires balancing with other fundamental rights 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality101. The emphasis within the GDPR is on 
generating adequate levels of protection that will create “the trust that will allow the digital 
economy to develop across the internal market.102“ The legal centre of gravity is that of 
fundamental rights, with internal market considerations playing a secondary role. It is also 
noteworthy that fundamental rights must be balanced in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality. Such an approach would provide a fundamental rights-based platform for 
harmonising copyright and moral rights at an EU level that could be achieved in a balanced 
way and one that respects both pecuniary and non-pecuniary interests. 
The CJEU was sympathetic to arguments in the Google Spain case103 that it should require, 
under Directive 95/46104, the withdrawal of data and the prohibition of access to certain 
data by the operators of search engines when that data was liable to compromise the 
fundamental right to data protection and the dignity of the data subject. Given that the 
interference with the privacy rights of the data subject was a serious one (the link, which the 
CJEU ordered should be removed, was to an extremely dated report regarding the forced 
sale of assets due to individual insolvency), the CJEU held that it was “ … clear that it cannot 
be justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of such an engine has in 
that processing … “.105 Thus the fundamental right of privacy was linked to dignity and 
together these rights outweighed any economic arguments available to Google Spain in that 
case.  
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EU hamonisation and copyright 
The EU harmonisation programmes106 have been introduced in order to facilitate single 
market integration and references to copyright have addressed the need to promote 
consumer choice, whilst preserving the economic incentives provided by copyright107.  The 
EU has sought to achieve a balance between these competing EU goals and values in the 
context of copyright harmonisation. For instance, the EU directive on Copyright in the 
Information Society seeks to attain a balance between promoting single market integration, 
the stimulation of innovation in goods and services, whilst also maintaining respect for 
intellectual property as a fundamental right, along with “freedom of expression and the 
public interest
 
“108. However, its focus has been on pecuniary rights, to the relative exclusion 
of moral rights. For example, Recital 5 of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive109 strongly 
emphasises the economic aspects of copyright: 
“5. The creative and artistic work of authors and performers necessitates an income 
as a basis for further creative and artistic work, and the investments required … The 
possibility of securing that income and recouping that investment can be effectively 
guaranteed only through adequate legal protection of the rightholders concerned.” 
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There is an increasing trend for directives relating to intellectual property to refer to 
fundamental rights110. For instance, Geiger has noted: “ … that the obligation to interpret EU 
law in a manner compliant with fundamental rights is not restricted to directives, but 
extends to the whole acquis communautaire, including the articles of the Treaty … “. Woods 
has highlighted that directives such as the Audiovisual Media Services and E-Commerce 
Directives “specifically note the need to respect freedom of expression.”111 The CJEU has 
ruled that there is an obligation on Member States to balance copyright with fundamental 
rights in the context of the E-Commerce Directive112 and the provision of information 
relating to alleged breaches of intellectual property rights and the enforcement mechanisms 
available under the Information Society Directive113. However, this trend has not entailed 
the evaluation of non-pecuniary rights, buttressed by dignity or privacy rights. For instance 
in Promusicae v Telefónica de España SAU114 the balancing of fundamental rights was 
entirely by reference to economic interests. The case related to the conflict between the 
revelation of the identities and addresses of those believed to have infringed copyright 
(through the use of illegal Internet services) and data privacy. The CJEU noted that the E-
Privacy Directive (Directive 2002/58)115, sought to respect the fundamental rights set out in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and contained “ … [t]he mechanisms allowing those different 
rights and interests to be balanced … [providing] for rules which determine in what 
circumstances and to what extent the processing of personal data is lawful and what 
safeguards … “116 were required. 
The Information Society Directive117 expressly excludes moral rights from its ambit, leaving 
this issue to be addressed by the legislation of the Member States. In the Deckmyn case 
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Advocate General Cruz Villalón stressed118 the need to balance the various Charter rights of 
human dignity, freedom of expression, freedom of the arts and sciences, the right to 
property, non-discrimination and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity when defining the 
autonomous EU concept of ‘parody’ under the Directive. The CJEU in Deckmyn119 focused on 
the right of freedom of expression, a fundamental right most obviously in tension with 
copyright. Here freedom of expression in the context of a parody with racist overtones had 
an obvious effect on the integrity of a work and the dignity of its author with the potential 
for false attribution. The CJEU also considered that a there was a legitimate interest in 
ensuring that copyright work was not associated with potentially racially offensive messages 
contained in such a parody120. However, in a remarkably brief judgment the CJEU assessed 
this harmful impact by reference to the interests of the copyright owner, not the author. The 
CJEU probably felt unable to address moral rights directly, given that the directive explicitly 
excluded from its scope moral rights. The CJEU’s assessment of the impact of parody on the 
dignity of the author inevitably involved a balancing of rights that implicitly involved non-
pecuniary or moral rights121. 
The CJEU has avoided evaluating on moral rights in the past, combining them with economic 
rights in order to address free movement issues122. In Musik-Vertrieb Membran123, it placed 
a strong emphasis on single market integration and economic rights issues when addressing 
the moral rights aspects of copyright. The case involved attempts by GEMA, a German 
copyright management society to prevent musical records and cassettes being imported into 
Germany, when these goods had already been placed on the market within the EU. The CJEU 
acknowledged the arguments of the French government that “ … copyright comprises moral 
rights … “ but chose to ignore these and gave all its attention to the economic aspects of 
copyright, “ … notably the right to exploit commercially the marketing of the protected 
                                                          
118
Case C-201/13 Johann Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen, Christiane 
Vandersteen, Liliana Vandersteen, Isabelle Vandersteen, Rita Dupont, Amoras II CVOH and WPG 
Uitgevers België at paragraph 73 of his Opinion. 
119
Ibid 
120
Ibid at paragraph 31 of its judgment 
121
Eleonora Rosati ‘Just a laughing matter? Why the decision in Deckmyn is broader than parody’ 
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review, Issue 2, pp. 511–529 
122
In Joined Cases 55 and 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v GEMA [1981] ECR 147 paragraph 
12 
123
Cases 55 & 57/80 Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v GEMA [1981] ECR 147 (at paragraph 12) when 
the CJEU acknowledged that “copyright comprises moral rights” of the kind indicated by the French 
Government in that case. However, the CJEU chose to concentrate on the fact that copyright “also 
comprises other rights, notably the right to exploit commercially”, when addressing a free movement 
issue. Advocate General Warner similarly chose to focus on the cross-border sale aspect of the case. 
 24 
work, particularly in the form of licences granted in return for payment of royalties … “124. 
Although the EU courts have shown little interest in the issue of moral rights with respect to 
their single market judgments rulings, certain judgments of the CJEU and the GCEU in the 
context of EU competition law have touched on the merits of national copyright and have 
tentatively, but inconclusively, linked authorial creativity and moral rights. 
EU competition law and authorial creativity 
With respect to competition law, EU courts have have sought to constrain the economic 
rights associated with national copyright laws in order to ensure that copyright does not 
impede single market integration or segment or exploit markets, with a view to promoting 
consumer choice. The EU courts have, at the same time, sought to retain sufficient legal 
protection of copyright owners’ economic rights in order incentivise innovation, which in 
turn is expected to benefit consumer welfare and European growth, an overarching goal 
under Article 3(3) TEU. 
The judicial application of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (‘TFEU’)
 
125 has been inherently economic, with the CJEU eschewing a 
broader public interest based approach to Article 102 TFEU, for instance in GlaxoSmithKline 
Services Unlimited v Commission126. This judicial analysis has pivoted around the concept of 
copyright as a purely economic right, the qualities of which may inhibit single market 
integration but which may also enhance favourable EU economic developments. For 
instance, technological developments are specifically mentioned as pro-competitive factors 
to be borne in mind when considering the anti-competitive effects of agreements or 
mergers that fall within the EU’s competition law jurisdiction under both Article 101(3)127 
and Article 2(1)(b) of the EU Merger Regulation128. Conversely, Article 102(b) TFEU views the 
suppression of innovation by a dominant undertaking as an anti-competitive abuse of that 
undertaking’s market power. The focus has been on whether an intellectual property right, 
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such as copyright, has the capacity to allow an abusive exercise of market power129 or the 
segmentation of markets130. Inherent in some of the competition law judgments of the CJEU 
and the GCEU is a tacit disapproval of national copyright lacking creative merit131. The GCEU 
in the Magill case sought to align both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights when addressing 
the scope of copyright, remarking that the essential purpose of copyright was: “ … to protect 
the moral rights in the work and ensure a reward for creative effort … “132. This attempt to 
highlight the underlying creativity needed to justify copyright and to indicate that the moral 
and economic aspects of copyright are linked was not supported by the CJEU, which passed 
over the issue. The CJEU focused on the need for copyright to respect the aims of EU 
competition law under Article 102 TFEU. A more overt shaping of copyright in the context of 
competition law was probably felt to be too controversial. The EU Commission’s goal in 
competition policy is to seek a balance between copyright and competition as part of a drive 
for innovation. As former Commissioner for Competition Policy Joaquín Almunia has 
remarked: “ … competition drives firms to look for a competitive edge and towards 
innovation … “133. To achieve this, the CJEU has avoided seeking to shape national copyright 
directly and has instead focused on mandatory licensing (an erosion of economic rights) in 
circumstances where it is attempting to foster greater follow-on innovation and satisfy 
consumer demand in a secondary market. 
EU copyright harmonisation past, present and future 
Recognising that some of the authorial aspects of copyright echo the concerns of moral 
rights (incentivisation and protecting creativity) and that an absence of harmonisation in this 
area could equally deter innovative effort, it would appear that the CJEU’s silence regarding 
moral rights is not wholly explicable from its recent judgments. However, this reluctance 
may be a result of judicial concerns that, having harnessed EU competition law and the 
doctrine of exhaustion of rights to promote the communication and circulation of goods and 
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services subject to copyright, too great a focus on moral rights (with their attendant 
authorial right of objection to derogatory treatment and, in France for instance, to non-
divulgation and withdrawal) might inhibit these developments. There may also be judicial 
anxiety that the exercise of moral rights by authors might create greater prospective harm 
to investments in and the dissemination and utilisation of copyright. A further factor is 
probably the absence of any harmonising legislative programme that directly relates to the 
moral rights aspects of copyright. It can be argued that the CJEU has limited capacity to take 
the reform of copyright further. This is particularly so, given that much of its case law is 
necessarily limited to single market integration and competition law issues under the 
relevant provisions of the TFEU, which provide inadequate tools for comprehensive reform. 
Existing Directives have acted as a springboard for interventions by the CJEU. The 
Information Society Directive134 in particular, with its relatively broad harmonising scope, 
has led to a number of references to the CJEU. Thus, the Infopaq135, Painer136 and 
Bezpecnostni137 cases have led to a focus on the author’s own intellectual creation as the 
test of originality, with even a few words being adequate to enjoy copyright protection. The 
CJEU’s ruling in Infopaq, for instance, was wider than that strictly required by the question 
referred to it. The author-centric approach adopted by the CJEU is entirely consistent with 
the underlying qualities of moral rights and suggests scope for far greater judicial creativity 
in the context of moral rights. Greater attention by the CJEU to the latter would aid 
harmonization and legal convergence at Member State level within the EU with respect to 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights, whilst at the same time protecting creativity. Since 
the CJEU seems happy to adopt the concepts inherent in the droit d’auteur system for 
pecuniary rights, it seems entirely logical for it to do so with respect to non-pecuniary, or 
moral, rights as well. 
 
Whilst Article 345 TEU has required that national intellectual property rights be respected, 
the territorial quality of partially harmonised national copyright138 has caused it to be 
challenged under non-discrimination139, free movement140 and competition law rules.141 
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However, there are limits to the effectiveness of CJEU rulings in breaking down national 
disparities. The exhaustion of rights doctrine has limits, as demonstrated in EMI Electrola 
GmbH v Patricia Im-und Export142, where EMI was able to invoke its unexpired copyright in 
Germany to prevent imports from Denmark of records no longer subject to Danish copyright 
protection. The CJEU expressly referred to the problems posed by inadequate 
harmonisation, according to Kur and Dreier “a hint” to embark on greater EU 
harmonisation143, leading to the introduction of the Term Directive.144 In addition, whilst the 
free movement rules have been applied to broadcasts in FAPL v QC Leisure145, doubt 
remains as to whether this will capture all service-based business models. The application of 
EU competition law necessitates the finding of an anti-competitive agreement or market 
power and its abusive exercise146. 
 
A number of legal developments have rendered this a potentially propitious moment to 
contemplate the codification of EU copyright law. For instance, Chiou believes that 
codification at a EU or national level presents “the existing or desired law in a 
comprehensive, consistent, rational and systematic way”147 comprising the consolidation of 
existing copyright directives “within a codified instrument”148 (either embracing the law as it 
currently stands, or the updating of the EU ‘acquis’) or the institution of uniform and 
comprehensive EU copyright legislation. The latter approach is regarded as overcoming the 
territorial quality of national (albeit partially harmonised) copyright, enhance transparency 
and as one that could “greatly reduce transaction and licensing costs.”149 
There have been suggestions that the time is right for codification in the Monti Report to the 
President of the EU Commission150 and most recently the EU Commission has issued a 
Communication proposing codification (of the current copyright acquis or by the adoption of 
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an optional unitary EU copyright title). The legislative landscape has also changed in the light 
of the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Ramalho has noted that: “Article 118 TFEU 
… paves the way for the introduction of a European unitary copyright title, valid in all 
European member states”151. The Regulation could be adopted by a qualified majority and 
the language of Article 118(1), with its reference to “uniform protection”, envisages a pan-
European law. 
This new power has been conferred contemporaneously with the publication of the Wittem 
Project European Copyright Code152, providing an academic regulatory template that 
addresses originality, authorship and ownership, moral and economic rights and attendant 
limitations. Whilst the proposed Code is not without flaws153, Rosati believes it achieves “a 
fair balance between common and civil law approaches to copyright.”154 
Conclusion 
It has been argued that EU harmonisation has focused on “low hanging fruit”
 
155 and that 
future reform will have to tackle more ingrained national differences than those addressed 
to date. However, merely codifying the existing acquis will not, nor would an optional title 
be sure to, overcome the principal difficulties associated with the current state of EU 
copyright law. 
Thus, the CJEU should either step up its discrete harmonisation of copyright law, including 
with respect to moral rights issues, or else the EU Member States should codify this field of 
law. The latter would enable the EU more easily to harmonise in a coherent and far-reaching 
way and one that would embrace moral rights in a manner that is reflective of the 
underlying fundamental right of dignity. A Regulation, such as that employed in the case of 
data protection, would allow a true alignment of all aspects of copyright (pecuniary and non-
pecuniary rights) and the accommodation and balancing of fundamental rights, whilst also 
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truing up single market integration considerations. Indeed, were such a Regulation to post-
date the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU, the loss of a Member state with a copyright law 
that has traditionally failed to focus on moral rights and authorial creativity may remove a 
potential impediment to future EU regulatory reform. 
